数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论：委托代理模型 [The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model] pdf epub mobi txt 电子书 下载 2025

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[美] 拉奉特（Laffont J.J.） 著

出版社： 世界图书出版公司

ISBN：9787510050503

版次：1

商品编码：11154485

包装：平装

外文名称：The Theory of Incentives:The Principal-Agent Model

开本：16开

出版时间：2013-01-01

用纸：胶版纸

页数：421

正文语种：英文

内容简介

　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.

内页插图

目录

Foreword
Introduction
1 Incentives in Economic'Thought
1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture
1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management
1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Croves: The Free-Rider Problem
1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting
1.5 L60n Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies
1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance
1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives
1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination
1.9 Incentives in Plaiined Economies
1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design
1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.1 The Basic Model
2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract
2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts
2.4 Information Rents
2.5 The Optunization Program of the PrincipaJ
2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off
2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information
2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing
2.9 The Revelation Principle
2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent
2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints
2.12 Commitment
2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms
2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting
2.15 Contract Theory at Work
Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection
3.1 More than Two Types
3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information
3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and
Countervailing Incentives
3.4 Random Participation Constraint
3.5 Limited Liability
3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification
3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-off
Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs
4.1 The Model
4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation
……
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard
6 Nonverifiability
7 Mixed Models
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment
9 Limits and Extensions

Re ferences
Author Index
Subject Index

前言/序言

　　The development of the theory of incentives has been a major advance iii eco- nomics in the last thirty years. The objective of this book is to provide easy access to this theory for undergraduate and first-year graduate smdents in economics. Our goal is not to be as complete as possible in covering and surveying the many contributions that have fiourished in the realm of incentive theory. Instead， our contribution is methodological and intended to offer students some iiiitial clues for analyzing the issues raised by this theory. As much as possible we have favored the simplest models to explain the core of the theory. The exposition has been divided into three books for methodological clarity. This volume presents the basic principal-agent theory with complete contracts. It allows a first exposition of the transaction costs created by contracting under asymmetric information without having to appeal to sophisticated game theory concepts.
　　The book allows for two levels of reading. Certain sections in some chapters are marked with a star to the right of the section head. A first reading should concentrate on the non-starred sections. These sections are accessible to readers who have a simple knowledge of maximization with inequality constraints. Most essential economic lessons can be understood from this first level of reading. Cov-ering the starred sections will enable smdents to manipulate the concepts for better assimilation and will put them in contact with the advanced topics of the field.
　　Going through the text and.checking the proofs should provide a good way for stu-dents to appropriate the material. Throughout the book we have listed under the heading the major references that are useful to pursue the study of incentive theory.
　　……

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都是英文，看不懂啊

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读者对象：数学、经济相关专业的本科生、研究生和相关经济领域的从业人员。

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委托代理理论是建立在非对称信息博弈论的基础上的。非对称信息(asymmetric information)指的是某些参与人拥有但另一些参与人不拥有的信息。信息的非对称性可从以下两个角度进行划分:一是非对称发生的时间，二是非对称信息的内容。从非对称发生的时间看，非对称性可能发生在当事人签约之前(ex ante)，也可能发生在签约之后(ex post)，分别称为事前非对称和事后非对称。研究事前非对称信息博弈的模型称为逆向选择模型(adverse selection)，研究事后非对称信息的模型称为道德风险模型(moral hazard)。从非对称信息的内容看，非对称信息可能是指某些参与人的行为(action)，研究此类问题的，我们称为隐藏行为模型(hidden action);也可能是指某些参与人隐藏的知识(knowledge)，研究此类问题的模型我们称之为隐藏知识模型(hidden knowledge)。

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给别人买的，还不错！

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读了这本书之后，数学与金融经典教材（影印版）·激励理论委托代理模型，超值。买书就来来京东商城。价格还比别家便宜，还免邮费不错，速度还真是快而且都是正版书。，买回来觉得还是非常值的。我喜欢看书，喜欢看各种各样的书，看的很杂，文学名著，流行小说都看，只要作者的文笔不是太差，总能让我从头到脚看完整本书。只不过很多时候是当成故事来看，看完了感叹一番也就丢下了。所在来这里买书是非常明智的。然而，目前社会上还有许多人被一些价值不大的东西所束缚，却自得其乐，还觉得很满足。经过几百年的探索和发展，人们对物质需求已不再迫切，但对于精神自由的需求却无端被抹杀了。总之，我认为现代人最缺乏的就是一种开阔进取，寻找最大自由的精神。中国人讲虚实相生，天人合一的思想，于空寂处见流行，于流行处见空寂，从而获得对于道的体悟，唯道集虚。这在传统的艺术中得到了充分的体现，因此中国古代的绘画，提倡留白、布白，用空白来表现丰富多彩的想象空间和广博深广的人生意味，体现了包纳万物、吞吐一切的胸襟和情怀。让我得到了一种生活情趣和审美方式，伴着笔墨的清香，细细体味，那自由孤寂的灵魂，高尚清真的人格魅力，在寻求美的道路上指引着我，让我抛弃浮躁的世俗，向美学丛林的深处迈进。合上书，闭上眼，书的余香犹存，而我脑海里浮现的，是一个皎皎明月，仙仙白云，鸿雁高翔，缀叶如雨的冲淡清幽境界。愿我们身边多一些主教般光明的使者，有更多人能加入到助人为乐、见义勇为的队伍中来。社会需要这样的人，世界需要这样的人，只有这样我们才能创造我们的生活，..-...-.我曾经属于后一类。那时，我处于极度危险的境地。看薛老师这些话，你能觉得这是一个真实的老师，她说的话就象是邻居唠家常那样真诚自然。对于书中她大胆、直率的言辞，我很钦佩，不是每个人都有这种胆识、思维的。她能把一件看似简单惯常的事情剖析提头头是道，透过了表象看到了它的内在根源。她有勇气把一些不同与大家都说的话写在纸上，让别人看，虽然多数人心理或许也如她所想。但凭这一点儿，就让人佩服至极。比如，她对老师象蜡烛、春蚕，没有教不好的学生，只有教不好的老师这些话的评析，一针见血，道出了我们老师的共同心声。之所以造就了她感说真话，敢于抵制一切不利于学生成长和进步的制度。因为薛老师的人生信念就是缺乏真诚、理性和趣味的日子是不值得过的。教育教学中有了平衡愉悦的心态，正确的定位和良好的策略，才能在饱满热情中，在正确策略中扶植学生向上。薛老师在自序中写道，我是特意捕捉了清风、乐声和野芳，录在这里，专门用于鼓励自己，就算是不定期地给自己献一小朵小花吧——真诚美丽的文字，正是心灵开出的花朵。又一次阐述了她的

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从90年代初起,拉丰教授开始关注组织中的激励问题,他深刻认识到了组织中的串谋行为对激励机制造成的扭曲是导致经济组织效率低下的一个最为根本的原因,因此在设计一个经济组织的激励机制时,必须考虑防范串谋的激励机制.a拉丰教授在这一领域作出了开创性的贡献,并将这些理论贡献集成在《激励与政治经济学》（1999年）一书中.