Liberty is hardly the "natural" order of things. In most places and at most times, the strong have dominated the weak and human freedom has been quashed by force or by customs and norms. Either states have been too weak to protect individuals from these threats or states have been too strong for people to protect themselves from despotism. Liberty emerges only when a delicate and precarious balance is struck between state and society.
There is a happy Western myth that political liberty is a durable construct, a steady state, arrived at by a process of "enlightenment." This static view is a fantasy, the authors argue; rather, the space to attain and maintain liberty stays open only via a fundamental and incessant struggle between state and society. The power of state institutions and the elites that control them has never gone uncontested in a free society. In fact, the capacity to contest them is the definition of liberty. State institutions have to evolve continuously as the nature of conflicts and needs of the society change, and thus society's ability to keep state and rulers accountable must intensify in tandem with the capabilities of the state. This struggle between state and society becomes self-reinforcing, inducing both to develop a richer array of capacities just to keep moving forward along the corridor. Yet this struggle also underscores the fragile nature of liberty. It is built on a delicate balance between state and society, between economic, political and social elites and citizens, between institutions and norms. One side of the balance gets too strong, and as it has often happened in history, liberty begins to wane. Liberty depends on the vigilant mobilization of society. But it also needs state institutions to continuously reinvent themselves in order to meet new economic and social challenges that can easily close the space liberty needs to survive.
Today we are in the midst of a time of wrenching destabilization. We need liberty more than ever, and yet the corridor to liberty is getting narrower and more treacherous. The danger on the horizon is not "just" the loss of our political freedom, however grim that is in itself; it is also to the prosperity and safety that critically depend on liberty. The opposite of the corridor of liberty is the road to ruin.
##1)框架還是有新意的,強國傢能力其實依賴於公民的信任和self compliance,最強的國傢能力最往往和強社會製約能力共生(shackled Leviathan),純專製國傢的政府能力通常都較為有限(天朝可能是例外)。2)由於社會/國傢力量初始條件不同,相同方嚮的衝擊可能會走嚮不同的均衡路徑。3)現代經濟體係愈發需要強國傢能力的支持,新的形勢要求國傢擴張乾預時,需要能夠結成廣泛的社會聯盟,既能製約監督擴大的利維坦,又能在不同利益群體間協商妥協。我感覺state-society contest model不足以裝下解釋政治發展路徑的野心,把普通民眾、經濟精英、公民社會、宗族酋長種姓等傳統社會力量都一股腦套為society過度簡約瞭。另外中國的章節有不少小史實錯誤,讀起來確實非常“外賓”。
評分##有點東扯西扯
評分##感覺論據有些單薄,比較先入為主。
評分##讀瞭核心篇章,red queen effect & corridor for li berty,非常曆史,也可能是涉及institutions論的文章都非常曆史…包括Violence and Social Orders…
評分##cliché and naive
評分##沒有中譯,藉標
評分##沒有中譯,藉標
評分##1)框架還是有新意的,強國傢能力其實依賴於公民的信任和self compliance,最強的國傢能力最往往和強社會製約能力共生(shackled Leviathan),純專製國傢的政府能力通常都較為有限(天朝可能是例外)。2)由於社會/國傢力量初始條件不同,相同方嚮的衝擊可能會走嚮不同的均衡路徑。3)現代經濟體係愈發需要強國傢能力的支持,新的形勢要求國傢擴張乾預時,需要能夠結成廣泛的社會聯盟,既能製約監督擴大的利維坦,又能在不同利益群體間協商妥協。我感覺state-society contest model不足以裝下解釋政治發展路徑的野心,把普通民眾、經濟精英、公民社會、宗族酋長種姓等傳統社會力量都一股腦套為society過度簡約瞭。另外中國的章節有不少小史實錯誤,讀起來確實非常“外賓”。
評分##cliché and naive
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